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ESSAY 
FROM LANGDELL TO LAW AND ECONOMICS: TWO 
CONCEPTIONS OF STARE DECISIS IN CONTRACT LAW 
AND THEORY 
Jody S. Kraus* 
N his classic monograph, The Death of Contract, Grant Gilmore 
argued that Christopher Columbus Langdell, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, and Samuel Williston trumped up the legal credentials for 
their classical bargain theory of contract law. Gilmore’s analysis has 
been subjected to extensive criticism, but its specific, sustained, and 
fundamental charge that the bargain theory was based on a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation of precedential authority has never been ques-
tioned. In this Essay, I argue that Gilmore’s case against the classical 
theorists rests on the suppressed premise that the precedential au-
thority of cases resides in the express judicial reasoning used to de-
cide them. In contrast, I argue that the classical theorists implicitly 
presuppose that the precedential authority of cases consists in the 
best theory that explains their outcomes, even if that theory is incon-
sistent with the case’s express judicial reasoning. The classical view 
of precedential authority completely defuses Gilmore’s charge of 
fraud. In Gilmore’s view, merely demonstrating the inconsistency 
between the proposition for which the classical theorists cited a case 
and the express reasoning in that case suffices as proof of misrepre-
sentation. But in the classical theorists’ view, the express reasoning in 
a case is simply a theory of its precedential authority, which, like any 
theory, can be wrong. Thus, the classical theorists simply reject Gil-
more’s claim that a case cannot properly be cited for a proposition 
inconsistent with its express reasoning. The real dispute, then, be-
tween Gilmore and the classical theorists is over the nature of prece-
dential authority and not the content of contract law. 
 I
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of Philosophy, and Al-
bert Clark Tate, Jr. Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. I thank 
Barry Cushman, Robert E. Scott, Ted White and workshop participants at Case 
Western Reserve University Law School, the University of Toronto Law School, and 
the University of Virginia School of Law for helpful comments. 
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Having reframed the classic death-of-contract debate, I then trace 
these competing conceptions of precedential authority through the 
major schools of contemporary contract theory. I argue that a con-
tract theory’s embrace of one view instead of the other can be ex-
plained by the relative priority it accords to each of the two compo-
nents in a conception of adjudicative legitimacy. A conception of 
adjudicative legitimacy consists in a theory of what it means for a 
decision to be based on law and a theory of what is required for law 
to be justified. I explain why theories according priority to the for-
mer tend to subscribe to the precedents-as-outcomes view, while 
theories according priority to the latter tend to favor the express rea-
soning view. The Essay concludes by arguing that the economic 
analysis of contract law subscribes to the precedents-as-outcomes 
view and therefore is the contemporary jurisprudential successor to 
the late nineteenth-century classical theorists. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
In Harris v. Watson (1791), Lord Kenyon held that “[n]o action 
will lie at the suit of a sailor on a promise of the captain to pay him 
extra wages in consideration of his doing more than the ordinary 
share of duty in navigating the ship.”1 His decision was based ex-
pressly on a “principle of policy”: “if sailors were . . . in times of 
danger entitled to insist on an extra charge on such a promise as 
this, they would in many cases suffer a ship to sink, unless the cap-
tain would pay any extravagant demand they might think proper to 
make.”2 In Stilk v. Myrick (1809), Lord Ellenborough held that an 
action did not lie on a captain’s promise to pay the remaining sail-
ors the wages of two sailors who had deserted the ship in a foreign 
port.3 One report of Stilk quotes Lord Ellenborough as stating “I 
think Harris v. Watson was rightly decided; but I doubt whether the 
ground of public policy, upon which Lord Kenyon is stated to have 
proceeded, be the true principle on which the decision is to be sup-
ported. Here, I say, the agreement is void for want of considera-
1 (1791) Peake 102, 102, 170 Eng. Rep. 94, 94 (K.B.). 
2 Id. 
3 (1809) 2 Camp. 317, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168 (K.B.). 
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tion.”4 In 1920, Samuel Williston, the author of the first modern 
treatise on contracts and then-future reporter of the Restatement of 
the Law of Contracts, agreed with Lord Ellenborough, citing both 
Harris and Stilk for the proposition in Section 130 of his treatise 
that a performance or promise to perform any obligation previ-
ously existing under a contract with the promisee is not valid con-
sideration.5 In his classic 1974 monograph, The Death of Contract, 
Grant Gilmore claimed “there is no conceivable way in which Har-
ris v. Watson can be taken to have been decided on consideration 
theory.”6 According to Gilmore, either Lord Ellenborough actually 
decided Stilk on the public policy ground stated in Harris but his 
reasoning was misreported, or he intentionally misinterpreted the 
ruling in Harris because he was “an owner’s man all the way who 
would use any theory, however far-fetched—even ‘want of consid-
eration’—to strike down seamen’s wage claims.”7 As to why Willis-
ton cited Harris and Stilk as authority for Restatement Section 130, 
Gilmore remained agnostic between the possibilities of “deliberate 
deception” and “unconscious distortion.”8 
An “owner’s man all the way,” “deliberate deception,” and “un-
conscious distortion”? Those were fightin’ words in 1974, and they 
still are today. Gilmore was taking aim at Williston’s efforts to 
marshal cases as precedential authority for the “bargain theory of 
consideration,” which, together with the objective theory of intent, 
comprised the doctrinal core of the nineteenth-century classical 
conception of contract law. The doctrine of consideration holds 
that promises are not legally enforceable unless supported by con-
sideration. The bargain theory, famously championed by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes,9 defines consideration as a performance or return 
4 2 Camp. at 319, 170 Eng. Rep. at 1169. 
5 1 Samuel Williston, The Law of Contracts § 130 (1931). 
6 Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 30 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., Ohio State 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1995). 
7 Id. at 29–30 & 127 n.57. 
8 Id. at 30. 
9 Holmes wrote that: 
[I]t is the essence of a consideration, that, by the terms of the agreement, it is 
given and accepted as the motive or inducement of the promise. Conversely, the 
promise must be made and accepted as the conventional motive or inducement 
for furnishing the consideration. The root of the whole matter is the relation of 
reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other, between consideration 
and promise. 
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promise that is “bargained for,” and states that a performance or 
return promise is bargained for if it is “sought by the promisor in 
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange 
for that promise.”10 Gilmore claimed that Langdell single-handedly 
“launch[ed] the idea that there was—or should be—such a thing as 
a general theory of contract,” that Holmes created the “broad phi-
losophical outline” of that theory, and that Williston fraudulently 
legitimated the theory in the “meticulous, although not always ac-
curate, scholarly detail” of case law.11 Stilk and Harris are Exhibits 
A and B in Gilmore’s brief to expose Williston’s fraud. 
Gilmore’s specific claim is that Holmes and Williston12 commit-
ted fraud by citing cases for doctrinal propositions that were un-
supported by, and in some cases contradicted by, the express judi-
cial reasoning of those cases. Once Gilmore purports to 
demonstrate the gap or inconsistency between the classical theo-
rists’ reading and the express reasoning of a case, he concludes that 
the classical theorists engaged in either deliberate deception or un-
conscious distortion. The conclusion is a non sequitur. Gilmore’s 
critique presupposes that an interpretation of a case is proper only 
 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 230 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap 
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881). 
10 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). The Restatement of the Law of 
Contracts incorporated the bargain theory of consideration in § 75 by defining consid-
eration for a promise as “an act other than a promise, or . . . a return promise, bar-
gained for and given in exchange for the promise.” Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts § 75 (1932). 
11 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 15. 
12 Gilmore never provides an example of a case that Langdell allegedly misinter-
preted. Instead, he claims Langdell based his theory of contract on an unreasoned and 
dogmatic explanation of a set of precedents that itself was unrepresentative of Ameri-
can contract law: 
[Langdell’s contracts casebook], according to Langdell, was to contain—and 
presumably did contain—all the important contract cases that had ever been 
decided. “All the cases” turned out to be mostly English cases, arranged in his-
torical sequence from the seventeenth century down to the date of publication; 
the English cases were occasionally supplemented by comparable sequences of 
cases from New York and Massachusetts—no other American jurisdictions be-
ing represented. The Summary [of the Law of Contracts, which Langdell added 
as an appendix to the second edition of his casebook in 1880], . . . is devoted al-
most entirely to explaining which of the cases in the main part of the casebook 
are “right” and which are “wrong.” The explanation, typically, is dogmatic, 
rather than reasoned; Langdell knew right from wrong, no doubt by divine 
revelation . . . .” 
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 13. 
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if it constitutes a plausible interpretation of the express judicial 
reasoning in the case. In contrast, Holmes and Williston implicitly 
presupposed the view that the doctrine a case sets as a precedent is 
the one that best explains its outcome, regardless of whether that 
doctrine is also a plausible interpretation of, or even consistent 
with, the express reasoning offered by the deciding judge. On their 
view, the express reasoning in a case is merely a theory, rather than 
constitutive statement, of the doctrinal precedent set by that case. 
The bare outcomes of cases, and not the express reasoning in cases, 
provide the data that doctrinal theories must explain and justify. 
On this view, the outcome is the only component of a case’s prece-
dential authority that is exclusively within the control of the decid-
ing judge. Even the outcome’s correct characterization for pur-
poses of identifying a case’s precedential authority, beyond the 
mere description of which party prevailed, is determined by the 
doctrinal interpretation that best explains why the prevailing party 
won.13 For convenience, I will refer to this view, somewhat mislead-
13 Karl Llewellyn defined the first question of case interpretation as an inquiry into  
what the court actually decided in a given case: judgment reversed, and new trial 
ordered. And the question of what express ratio decidendi it announced. These 
are facts of observation. They are the starting point of all discussion. Until you 
have them there is no use doing any arguing about anything. 
K.N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 76 (1960). The second 
question, however, is 
what the rule of the case is, as derived from its comparison with a number of 
other cases. This is not so simple, but the technical procedures for determining 
it are clear. Skilled observers should rather regularly be able to agree on two 
points: (i) the reasonably safe maximum rule that case can be used for; (ii) the 
reasonably certain minimum rule the case must be admitted to contain. 
Id.  
 Llewellyn referred to the view of precedential authority that identifies cases with 
the minimum rule as the “orthodox” or “strict” view of precedent. According to the 
orthodox view, “[t]he express ratio decidendi is prima facie the rule of the case, since 
it is the ground upon which the court chose to rest its decision.” Id. at 66. In contrast, 
Llewellyn referred to the view of precedential authority that identifies cases with their 
maximum rule as the “loose” view: 
the view that a court has decided, and decided authoritatively, any point or all 
points on which it chose to rest a case, or on which it chose, after due argument, 
to pass. . . . In its extreme form this results in thinking and arguing exclusively 
from language that is found in past opinions, and in citing and working with that 
language wholly without reference to the facts of the case which called the lan-
guage forth. 
Id. at 67–68.  
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ingly, as the view that the precedential authority of cases resides in 
their outcomes alone, or the precedents-as-outcomes view for 
short.14 In contrast, if precedential authority resides in express judi-
cial reasoning, the doctrine established by a case is identical to the 
justification for the outcome of that case expressly articulated by 
the judge who decided it, regardless of whether that justification 
provides an adequate or consistent, let alone compelling, explana-
tion for that outcome.15 
Acknowledging the existence and plausibility of these competing 
views of the nature of precedential authority defuses Gilmore’s in-
cendiary charge that the classical theorists engaged in fraud or neg-
ligent misrepresentation. Instead, it exposes a much deeper dis-
agreement, submerged below the surface of Gilmore’s complaint, 
over the role of express judicial reasoning in the proper interpreta-
tion of precedent and over the role of stare decisis in transforming 
 Note that Llewellyn’s two conceptions both identify precedential authority with the 
express language of cases. While the orthodox view limits the rule of a case to the ex-
press reasoning that determined its outcome (its ratio decidendi), the loose view in-
cludes as the rule of a case potentially all express reasoning in that case, regardless of 
whether it was outcome determinative in that case (obiter dicta). In contrast, the 
precedents-as-outcomes view I identify and associate with the classical theorists re-
jects the claim that the rule of a case is necessarily defined by its express reasoning, 
including express reasoning that Llewellyn would characterize as its ratio decidendi. 
For the classical theorists, the ratio decidendi consists in the best theory of the case’s 
outcome, and the express reasoning of the case is just one theory among others. 
14 It is misleading only because the doctrinal precedent set by a case, on this view, 
consists not merely in its outcome, but rather in the theory that best explains and jus-
tifies that outcome, together with other outcomes that the theory treats as related. So 
characterized, however, the precedents-as-outcomes view confronts a bootstrap prob-
lem: If case outcomes are the data that legal theories explain, then they must be iden-
tifiable pretheoretically. Yet even a minimal characterization case requires some the-
ory for determining which facts are relevant. The precedents-as-outcomes view need 
not claim, however, that outcomes can or must be characterized independently of 
theoretical presuppositions. Rather, it characterizes case outcomes by making the 
fewest theoretical presuppositions possible and identifies precedential authority with 
the theory that best explains those outcomes. In contrast, the express reasoning view 
holds that precedential authority resides entirely in the court’s express reasoning. It 
therefore treats competing theories of case outcomes that are inconsistent with the 
express reasoning of those cases as irrelevant to a case’s precedential authority. 
15 For a detailed argument that economic contract theories embrace the precedents-
as-outcomes view and deontic (that is, nonconsequentialist) contract theories endorse 
the express reasoning view, see Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law in The 
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 687 (Jules Coleman & 
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). 
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bad precedents into good law. In this Essay, I reexamine Gilmore’s 
case against the formalists and argue that it is constructed almost 
entirely on the suppressed premise that the precedential authority 
of cases resides in their express judicial reasoning. Against all but 
one of Gilmore’s charges of improper citation of legal authority, 
the classical theorists can effectively defend their treatment of 
precedent as proper by arguing that their interpretation of a case 
provides the best explanation and justification of its outcome, re-
gardless of its relationship to the express judicial reasoning in the 
case. Against the remaining charge, the classical theorists’ view of 
stare decisis explains why they would insist that a doctrine entailed 
by their conception of contract law is a valid part of American con-
tract law even though a well-known contrary line of cases left the 
question concededly unsettled. This reexamination, then, demon-
strates that Gilmore’s conclusions simply beg the question against 
the classical theorists’ implicit view of the nature of precedential 
authority and the role of stare decisis. Gilmore’s debate with the 
classical theorists only appears to be over the substantive doctrinal 
content of late nineteenth-century contract law. Although he evi-
dently did not realize it, Gilmore’s real disagreement with the clas-
sical theorists is over the nature of precedential authority. And that 
debate was never engaged because neither Gilmore nor the classi-
cal theorists explicitly articulated, let alone defended, their views of 
precedential authority. 
The question then naturally arises why the classical theorists 
would implicitly subscribe to the precedents-as-outcomes view and 
why Gilmore would reject it. I argue that the choice a theorist 
makes between the two views of precedential authority is likely to 
be influenced by the relative weight the theorist assigns to each of 
the two prongs of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy: a theory 
of what it means for a decision to be based on law and a theory of 
what is required for law to be justified.16 Thus, the first prong of a 
conception of adjudicative legitimacy provides an explanation that 
connects the outcome of a case with the legal rules and principles 
that are supposed to explain that outcome. For example, a legal 
16 The claim here is not that a conception of adjudicative legitimacy logically entails 
any particular view of precedential authority, but only that some pairings of particular 
conceptions of adjudicative legitimacy with certain views of precedential authority 
will be more theoretically congenial than others. See infra Part I and Section II.B. 
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rule or principle might be connected to the outcome of a case be-
cause it uniquely determines that outcome given the facts of the 
case. Alternatively, the legal rule or principle might be merely con-
sistent with the outcome of a case even though it falls short of 
uniquely determining it. The second prong of a conception of adju-
dicative legitimacy assumes that case outcomes can be satisfactorily 
explained by the legal rules and principles of those cases but seeks 
to explain why those rules and principles would justify those out-
comes. For example, suppose the outcome of a case was uniquely 
determined by the application of a legal rule instructing a judge to 
flip a coin to determine which litigant should prevail. The second 
prong of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy must explain why 
the coin-toss rule is justified as a method of determining which 
party should win. Ultimately, the second prong must explain why 
the legal rules and principles of a case justify the state in exercising 
coercion to enforce the court’s judgment. The second prong there-
fore must invoke a moral or political theory that explains why co-
ercive state enforcement of a particular legal regime is justified. I 
argue that the classical contract theorists were attracted to the view 
of precedents-as-outcomes because their more general jurispruden-
tial view, which Thomas Grey has termed “classical orthodoxy,”17 
places almost exclusive priority on the first prong of adjudicative 
legitimacy—explaining how the legal rules and principles of a case 
lead to its outcome. 
The formalism underlying the classical theory of contract law, of 
course, ultimately succumbed to legal realism, and later to Critical 
Legal Studies (“CLS”). Legal realists such as Gilmore, and CLS 
theorists such as Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger, argued 
that the legal reasoning of contract decisions played little or no role 
in explaining, let alone justifying, those decisions. In the same pe-
riod Gilmore wrote The Death of Contract, Charles Fried pub-
lished the first contemporary deontic theory of contract law and 
Charles Goetz, Robert Scott, and Richard Posner published ex-
planatory economic theories of contract law. Both the deontic and 
economic theories of contract were responses to the legacy of legal 
realism and CLS. But Fried’s deontic theory exclusively challenged 
their skepticism about the possibility of satisfying the second prong 
17 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1983). 
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of a conception of adjudicative legitimacy for contract law—the 
prong that purports to prove that the state is justified in exercising 
coercion to enforce the rules and principles of contract law. Fried’s 
concern was to demonstrate that the legal rules and principles of 
contract law are grounded in a moral theory that justifies the exer-
cise of state coercion. He gave virtually no thought to the question 
of how those rules and principles are connected to the outcomes of 
contract cases. Fried’s theory implicitly relies on the express rea-
soning view of precedential authority. I argue that this view is con-
ducive to his view that contract law is justified by the moral prom-
ise principle. The economic analysts, however, primarily 
challenged the realist and CLS skepticism over the possibility of 
satisfying the first prong of a conception of adjudicative legiti-
macy—the prong that purports to explain how the legal reasoning 
in contracts cases connects to their results. Like the classical con-
tract theorists, the economic analysts implicitly believed that legal 
reasoning can explain a case outcome only if it uniquely deter-
mines it. In this respect, the explanatory economic analysts inher-
ited the jurisprudential mantle of the nineteenth-century classical 
contract theorists. 
The thesis of this Essay is that the competing conceptions of con-
tract law advanced in both classical and contemporary theories of 
contract can be properly understood, compared, and assessed only 
by identifying the view of precedential authority to which each im-
plicitly subscribes. This view will be influenced by the relative pri-
ority each theory accords to the two different prongs of a concep-
tion of adjudicative legitimacy: explaining how a contract case 
outcome is based on the contract law that is supposed to explain it 
and explaining why the state is justified in exercising coercion to 
enforce contract law. Part I presents the tenets of “classical ortho-
doxy” that explain and motivate the formalists’ conception of con-
tract law, their adherence to the precedents-as-outcomes view of 
precedential authority, and their conception of stare decisis. It then 
carefully examines Gilmore’s critique of the classical conception of 
contract law, including the bargain theory of consideration and the 
objective theory of intent, and argues that Gilmore’s critique begs 
the question against the classical theorists’ view of precedents-as-
outcomes. Part II then introduces contemporary deontic theories 
of contract and argues that Charles Fried’s theory implicitly pre-
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supposes that the precedential authority of cases resides exclu-
sively in their express judicial reasoning. It also explains why Fried 
would be attracted to this view. Part III supports the claim that 
economic analysts of contract law subscribe to the precedents-as-
outcomes view by reviewing excerpts from the joint scholarship of 
Robert Scott and Charles Goetz, and the early scholarship of Rich-
ard Posner. It also tries to explain why explanatory economic ana-
lysts would find this view congenial to their approach to contract 
law.  
I. CLASSICAL ORTHODOXY AND ITS AFFINITY TO THE PRECEDENT-
AS-OUTCOMES VIEW 
When Christopher Columbus Langdell joined the Harvard law 
faculty as Dean and began preparations for teaching contract law 
in 1870, he set out to design a course that would treat the subject of 
contract law as a science. For Langdell, that meant adhering to the 
tenets of what Thomas Grey has termed “classical orthodoxy.”18 
On loose analogy with geometry, classical orthodoxy postulated 
that a field of law amenable to scientific analysis is governed by a 
few general master principles from which more precise legal rules 
could be deduced. Those rules, in turn, are applied to the specific 
facts of a dispute to determine a result. But how did classical or-
thodoxy identify the principles of contract law in the first place? 
Were the principles of contract law ultimately external to the con-
tracts cases, and the cases themselves mere evidence of those prin-
ciples, as antebellum jurisprudence had traditionally conceived 
much of the common law?19 Or did those principles not only reside 
in but originate from contract case law itself? According to Grey’s 
lucid explication, classical orthodoxy induced the general principles 
of contract law from the cases themselves, whose ultimate author-
ity was derived from the principle of stare decisis. Once a line of 
cases was sufficiently established, the principle induced from those 
cases constituted a principle of law. 
Langdell invented the law casebook—his most enduring tangible 
legacy—as a pedagogical device for illustrating how the principles 
18 Grey, supra note 17, at 2. 
19 See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 13, at 43–44 (1960); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis 
and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1, 23–27 (2001). 
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of contract law could be found in contracts cases. Had Langdell’s 
examination of contracts case law led him to conclude that the set 
of principles underlying the cases was logically incoherent or inter-
nally inconsistent—or worse, that no set of principles could be in-
duced from the cases because they were hopelessly vague—he 
would no doubt have abandoned his conception of contract law as 
legal science. (Indeed, this was Langdell’s view of public law.)20 But 
instead, Langdell’s analysis of the cases led him to conclude that 
contract law was comprised of a logically consistent set of basic 
principles from which the correct rules of contract law could be de-
rived. Those principles provided the logical basis for his evaluation 
of all contract decisions. Any case decided contrary to the rules 
logically entailed by the general principles of contract law was 
wrongly decided. All cases following the principle or rule in an er-
roneously decided case would also be dismissed as incorrect, unless 
and until those decisions accumulated over time and became an es-
tablished line of precedent. In that event, the erroneous rule would 
be transformed into good law under the principle of stare decisis. 
Langdell and his followers hoped, of course, that their clarification 
of the internal logical structure and principles of contract law 
would enable judges to decide cases accordingly, and that errone-
ous decisions would be quickly identified and rejected as bad 
precedent, rather than repeatedly reaffirmed to the point where 
they would acquire the force of law by virtue of brute persistence. 
Indeed, Williston, a disciple of Langdell and fellow traveler in clas-
sical orthodoxy, took this position, which, in turn, was the raison 
d’etre of the Restatement project he pioneered.21 
20 See Grey, supra note 17, at 34 (“The classicists did not regard public law, includ-
ing constitutional law, as amenable to scientific study at all. . . . Constitutional law was 
unscientific, because hopelessly vague . . . .”). 
21 See Samuel Williston, Change in the Law, 69 U.S. L. Rev. 237, 239 (1935) (“I be-
lieve also that the best path at the present time and in the future for judicial decisions 
is in a fuller recognition of stare principiis as a qualification of stare decisis. This in-
volves both a greater willingness to overrule outworn cases and outworn principles, 
and greater frankness in so doing.”); Samuel Williston, Fashions in Law with Illustra-
tions from the Law of Contracts, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 119, 133 (1942) (“Though Langdell’s 
colleagues differed from him in many ways, they agreed in seeking fundamental legal 
principles and testing them by observing their logical consequences in every conceiv-
able aspect. If precedents conflicted with some of these consequences, and no good 
reason could be found for the precedents, they were criticized. Stare principiis, rather 
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Grey’s discussion explains the foundational role classical ortho-
doxy accords to stare decisis. But the principle of stare decisis is 
only a part of the broader theory of precedential authority to which 
classical orthodoxy subscribes. As noted in the Introduction, classi-
cal orthodoxy paired its claim that contract law consisted in general 
principles induced from contracts precedents with the precedents-
as-outcomes view of precedential authority. This view, of course, 
differs from the view that the precedential authority of a case re-
sides in express judicial reasoning, regardless of whether that rea-
soning provides an adequate or consistent, let alone compelling, 
explanation for that outcome. 
We can speculate that the adherents of classical orthodoxy were 
attracted to the precedents-as-outcomes view because they aspired 
to impose scientific rigor—or their late nineteenth-century concep-
tion of it—on contract law by demonstrating that it was coherent, 
conceptually ordered, precise, complete, and determinate. Classical 
orthodoxy would find the precedents-as-outcomes view congenial 
because it would likely view the outcome of a case as the law’s 
closest analogue to the empirical data of the hard sciences that in-
spires classical orthodoxy. There can be no doubt that the outcome 
of a case has the force of law—the judicial order at the end of 
every case is legally authoritative and binding on the legal officials 
to whom it is directed. What a judge says about his decision could 
be arguable and fallible, but under the principle of res judicata, his 
ruling for one party over the other undeniably has the force of law 
unless and until it is overturned on appeal. 
In addition, by treating outcomes as the only legal facts estab-
lished by a judicial decision, classical orthodoxy maximizes its abil-
ity to unify contract law under a small and coherent set of princi-
ples induced from prior decisions. At the same time, it minimizes 
the extent to which the principle of stare decisis can undermine the 
coherence of contract law over time. Similarly, cases whose express 
reasoning would otherwise render them inapposite as illustrations 
of the application of rules derived from those principles can serve 
as ideal illustrations provided only that their outcomes are consis-
tent with those rules. Simply put, the view that precedential au-
than stare decisis, controlled much of the thought in the school.”); see also William 
Draper Lewis, Introduction in Restatement of the Law of Contracts, at viii–ix (1932). 
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thority resides in case outcomes alone increases the flexibility of 
the cases to accommodate a more theoretically elegant theory of 
contract law. Treating case outcomes as legal wheat, and express 
judicial reasoning as legal chaff, maximizes the prospects of main-
taining the scientific respectability of the law. Or as Gilmore might 
have put the point had he considered it, if cases are treated as the 
legal “data” for a “science” of contract law, the view that the pre-
cedential authority of cases resides exclusively in their outcomes is 
more conducive to data manipulation than the view that assigns 
precedential authority to express judicial reasoning as well. 
Classical orthodoxy’s aspiration to scientific rigor was not, how-
ever, an end in itself. Classical orthodoxy aspired to demonstrate 
the scientific rigor of contract law in order to establish the legiti-
macy of contract decisions.22 Classical orthodoxy is motivated by 
the same conception of adjudicative legitimacy described in the In-
troduction: that cases should be decided on the basis of justified 
law. Demonstrating that contract cases were legitimately adjudi-
cated, therefore, required an account of what it means to decide a 
case on the basis of law and for the law to be justified. The formal-
ists focused almost exclusively on developing a theory of the for-
mer. In their view, a case is decided on the basis of law only if its 
outcome is uniquely determined by the applicable law. Classical or-
thodoxy itself is designed to insure that this requirement will be 
satisfied. According to classical orthodoxy, the rules governing 
contract cases are mutually consistent, well-ordered, and compre-
hensive. This means that every possible contract case will always be 
governed uniquely by a contract rule that determines a unique re-
sult. Classical orthodoxy is therefore designed to insure that the 
outcomes of contracts cases are uniquely determined by contract 
rules, and thereby legitimate because decided on the basis of law. 
The system of classical orthodoxy also acknowledged that de-
terminacy of outcomes was merely a necessary condition for adju-
dicative legitimacy. It recognized that the legal rules that deter-
mined the outcomes must themselves be justified for the decision 
to be legitimate. Classical orthodoxy accounted for the justification 
of legal rules by allowing that considerations of “acceptability” 
were to be taken into account during the process of inducing gen-
22 See, e.g., Grey, supra note 17, at 12–13. 
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eral principles of contract law from prior contracts cases. But clas-
sical orthodoxy paid little more than lip service to this dimension of 
adjudicative legitimacy. Its principal agenda was to demonstrate 
the adjudicative legitimacy of contract law by explaining how con-
tract law determined outcomes in contract cases. In sum, the con-
tract law the formalists identified and subsequently enshrined ini-
tially in Williston’s contracts treatise, and later in the highly 
influential Restatement of Contracts, was ultimately a product of 
their view that contract adjudication must be legitimate, that le-
gitimacy requires that case results be determined by the application 
of rules derived from a small set of principles induced from prior 
contracts cases, and that precedential authority is governed by stare 
decisis and resided in case outcomes alone, rather than express ju-
dicial reasoning. 
A. Gilmore’s Critique of the Bargain Theory of Consideration 
That classical orthodoxy in fact subscribed to the view that pre-
cedential authority resides in case outcomes alone is evident from a 
careful analysis of Gilmore’s critique of Williston’s use of prece-
dential authority in his treatise on contracts. Let us return to the 
discussion of Stilk v. Myrick and Harris v. Watson—the first two of 
four exhibits Gilmore offers as evidence that the formalists’ bar-
gain theory of consideration originated in fraud—and in particular, 
to his argument that Section 130 of Williston’s contracts treatise 
was a product of unconscious distortion or deliberate deception. 
Williston cites Stilk and Harris as illustrations of the result com-
pelled by the rule governing the enforceability of agreements to 
modify prior agreements, which is itself logically entailed by the 
consideration principle.23 Gilmore claimed that Langdell and 
Holmes had insufficient case law authority from which to induce 
the general principle of bargained-for consideration in the first in-
stance. But Williston offered neither Stilk nor Harris as authority 
for the bargain theory of consideration itself. Instead, he cited 
them as authority for rules that are derivable from that principle. 
Once we grant that the bargain theory of consideration is a princi-
ple of contract law (based on other precedents), the rule that modi-
fications are unenforceable absent fresh consideration follows as a 
23 Williston, supra note 5, at § 130. 
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matter of logic. Stilk and Harris are illustrative authority for that 
proposition by virtue of their outcomes alone. In both cases, an 
agreement to modify a preexisting agreement is held unenforce-
able because it is unsupported by additional consideration. Even if 
other explicit reasons might have been offered for those decisions 
by the judges who decided them, or were otherwise available to 
explain them, Williston (like Langdell) treated them as rightly de-
cided because their result was logically compelled by a general 
principle of contract law he took to be independently established. 
While Williston’s citation of Stilk conceivably could be based on 
its express judicial reasoning (as quoted in only one of two reports 
of the case), his citation of Harris could not. The only noncynical 
explanation for Williston’s citation of Harris is that he believed the 
legal authority of a case resides ultimately in its outcome and is not 
controlled by its express judicial reasoning. Moreover, this is pre-
cisely the view of precedential authority Lord Ellenborough explic-
itly embraced in Stilk when he said: “I think Harris v. Watson was 
rightly decided; but I doubt whether the ground of public policy, 
upon which Lord Kenyon is stated to have proceeded, be the true 
principle on which the decision is to be supported.”24 For Lord El-
lenborough, and later Williston, the “true principle” of law a case 
sets as a precedent is the one that provides the most fundamental 
ground for the decision, irrespective of the express reasoning in the 
opinion. In fact, in his critique of Williston’s analysis of Dickinson 
v. Dodds (1876),25 Gilmore himself appeared to realize that Willis-
ton’s analysis presupposes this view of precedential authority.26 
Dickinson is the third exhibit Gilmore offered as evidence that 
Williston systematically distorted precedent to fit his theory of con-
tract law. In Dickinson, Dodds made an offer on a Wednesday to 
sell land to Dickinson and at the same time promised that the offer 
would be “left over” until Friday morning. But before Dickinson 
attempted to accept the offer on Thursday evening, Dodds sold the 
land to Allan.27 In Gilmore’s view, the statement that the offer 
would be “left over” is ambiguous between an expiration date for a 
24 (1809) 2 Camp. 317, 319, 170 Eng. Rep. 1168, 1169 (K.B.). 
25 (1876) 2 Ch.D. 463. 
26 See Gilmore, supra note 6, at 31–33. 
27 Dickinson, 2 Ch.D. at 463–64. 
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revocable offer and a promise not to revoke the offer.28 In addition, 
citing the opinion of Lord Justice Mellish in Dickinson, Gilmore 
claimed that the court held for Dodds solely on the ground that 
Dickinson’s mind could not have met with Dodds’s mind after 
Dodds sold the land to Allan.29 But Williston cited Dickinson as the 
leading case authority for Section 55 of his treatise on contracts, 
which states that “offers unless under seal or given for considera-
tion may be revoked at any time prior to the creation of a contract 
by acceptance.”30 Gilmore concluded that Williston distorted the 
ruling in Dickinson: 
[T]he Holmesians, describing themselves as objectivists, had 
nothing but scorn for “subjective” or “meeting of the minds” 
theory. The case was therefore restated as one involving, on 
the facts, an offer clearly meant to be irrevocable and the re-
sult was explained on the ground that Dodds had received no 
“consideration” for the assurance of irrevocability.31 
In fact, Gilmore’s analysis of Dickinson can be refuted even on its 
own terms.32 But even if we were to concede Gilmore’s description 
28 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 31. 
29 Id. at 31–32. 
30 Williston, supra note 5, at § 55. 
31 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 32. 
32 Here, Gilmore himself is playing fast and loose with Dickinson. Even a superficial 
reading of Lord Justice James’s opinion, the other opinion in Dickinson, proves that 
the court expressly decided the case, at least in part, on consideration theory: 
“This offer to be left over until Friday . . . .” That shews it was only an offer. 
There was no consideration given for the undertaking or promise, to whatever 
extent it may be considered binding, to keep the property unsold until 9 o’clock 
on Friday morning . . . [I]t is clear settled law, on one of the clearest principles 
of law, that this promise, being a mere nudum pactum was not binding, and that 
at any moment before a complete acceptance by Dickinson of the offer, Dodds 
was as free as Dickinson himself. 
2 Ch.D. at 472. Moreover, Lord Justice Mellish begins his opinion by explicitly agree-
ing with Lord Justice James on this question: 
I am of the same opinion. . . . [T]his being only an offer, the law says—and it is a 
perfectly clear rule of law—that, although it is said that the offer is to be left 
open until Friday morning at 9 o’clock, that did not bind Dodds. He was not in 
point of law bound to hold the offer over until 9 o’clock on Friday morning. 
Id. at 473–74. It is therefore quite clear that both opinions in Dickinson interpret 
Dodds’s statement that his offer would be “left over” until Friday morning as a prom-
ise not to retract his offer until Friday morning, and both Justices rule that this prom-
ise is unenforceable for lack of consideration. 
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of the facts and express judicial reasoning in Dickinson, his critique 
of Williston’s analysis of Dickinson, like his critique of Williston’s 
analysis of Harris and Stilk, presupposes that the precedential au-
thority of cases resides in their express reasoning rather than in 
their outcomes alone. Yet even Gilmore appeared to realize that 
Williston treated results, rather than judicial reasoning, as the only 
authoritative component of cases when he wrote that “[t]he result 
in Dickinson v. Dodds commended itself to the Holmesian theo-
rists more than the facts or Mellish’s reasoning did.”33 
For Williston, it would not have mattered if the Dickinson court 
had not expressly based its opinion on the consideration principle. 
Since the consideration principle made Dodds’s promise not to re-
voke his offer unenforceable, it was the proper ground for the deci-
sion even if consideration was not the express judicial ground for 
deciding the case. Gilmore noted that Section 55 of Williston’s 
treatise not only declares offers revocable absent consideration, 
but further states that offers remain revocable even if the offer is 
expressly held open for a definite period of time and the offeror 
promises not to revoke it. Gilmore wrote: 
Williston evidently treats the second and third propositions . . . as 
logical deductions from the general principle. Williston, when he 
wanted to, could read cases accurately; in this instance he did not 
bother to pretend that the subordinate propositions were directly 
 But the ruling that the promise to hold the offer open was not enforceable was not 
sufficient to decide the case. The Justices still had to consider whether a contract was 
formed when Dickinson attempted to accept Dodds’s offer. Both opinions concluded 
that acceptance did not occur because, on the version of the meeting of the minds 
theory to which Lord Justices James and Mellish subscribed, Dickinson lacked the 
power to accept Dodds’s offer once he knew that Dodds had sold the property to 
Allan. Id. Thus, while Gilmore was right that Dickinson was decided in part on the 
basis of the meeting of the minds theory, he was wrong that this is the sole basis of the 
opinion. And he was certainly wrong that Williston distorted the facts by interpreting 
the term “left over” to mean “held open” and that Williston ignored or distorted the 
express reasoning in Dickinson when he cited it as authority for the proposition that a 
promise to hold an offer open is unenforceable if not supported by consideration. But 
as I argue in the text below, even if Gilmore had been right, Williston’s citation of 
Dickinson would have constituted distortion only if its precedential authority is pre-
sumed to reside in its express judicial reasoning, rather than its outcome alone. 
33 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 32. 
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involved in Dickinson v. Dodds. It was enough that they “logi-
cally” followed from it.34 
Although Gilmore was mistaken that these propositions cannot 
be directly supported by Dickinson,35 Gilmore was right to conclude 
that it would be enough for Williston that they logically followed 
from it. In fact, on Williston’s view, the subordinate propositions 
follow from the general principle of consideration, as does the 
main proposition of Section 55. Moreover, except for the unfortu-
nate and relatively rare instance of an erroneous but established 
line of cases, Williston did not need to read the opinions to identify 
the legal rules they stood for. Those rules could be deduced from 
the general principles of contract law alone. 
Classical orthodoxy’s implicit view that the precedential author-
ity of cases resides in their outcomes alone dissolves Gilmore’s cri-
tique of Williston’s analysis of Harris, Stilk, and Dickinson. Simi-
larly, classical orthodoxy’s view that stare decisis has the power to 
transform erroneous decisions into law undermines Gilmore’s cri-
tique of Williston’s analysis of Foakes v. Beer (1884),36 the final ex-
hibit Gilmore offered as evidence of Williston’s fraudulent support 
for the bargain theory of consideration.37 In Foakes, the court held 
unenforceable an alleged agreement to discharge interest due on a 
debt in return for full payment of the outstanding principal.38 In this 
case, Gilmore conceded that the judge actually cited lack of con-
sideration as the ground for the decision, but the judge did so 
based on a dictum in a case decided in 1602 by Lord Coke, despite 
Lord Coke’s having rejected that theory in subsequent cases and 
the existence of substantial case law that found such releases en-
forceable, both in express reasoning and result.39 Williston cited the 
case as authority for Section 120 of his treatise, which explains that 
any agreement to discharge a debt in return for payment of a lesser 
amount is unenforceable unless supported by separate considera-
tion above and beyond the payment of part of the amount due.40 
34 Id. at 33. 
35 See supra note 32. 
36 (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L.) (appeal taken from England). 
37 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 33–36. 
38 9 App. Cas. 605. 
39 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 35. 
40 Williston, supra note 5, at § 120. 
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Acknowledging the substantial case law to the contrary, Williston 
wrote that Section 120 nonetheless “has at least the merit of consis-
tency with the general rule of consideration governing the forma-
tion and discharge of contracts.”41 
By characterizing Williston’s cautious statement as a “note of 
somewhat muted triumph,” Gilmore implied that Williston was 
conceding that Section 120 lacks sufficient precedential authority 
to constitute an accurate statement of settled law.42 In Gilmore’s 
view, Williston’s authority for Section 120 is so obviously weak that 
it exposes the fraud that Williston otherwise manages to submerge 
just below the surface of his analysis of contract law throughout his 
entire treatise. But once Williston’s position is viewed in light of 
classical orthodoxy’s view of stare decisis, Gilmore’s interpretation 
of Williston’s analysis cannot be sustained. Williston’s claim is that 
Section 120 is correct because it is entailed by the general principle 
of (the bargain theory of) consideration. However, he acknowl-
edged that if it gains sufficient acceptance, a line of cases reaching 
results inconsistent with this rule might dislodge the rule under the 
principle of stare decisis. Williston’s position is that a contrary line 
of cases does exist, that it is based on erroneous reasoning because 
it is logically contradicted by the principle of consideration, but 
that it is an open question which line of cases will ultimately gain 
acceptance and become part of contract law. Williston was merely 
pointing out that the line of cases supporting Section 120 is the cor-
rect one, and for that reason should win out, even if under stare de-
cisis, its merits cannot guarantee that it will. 
B. Gilmore’s Critique of the Objective Theory of Intent 
The bargain theory of contract is just one of two essential doc-
trines in the core of the classical theory of contract. The other doc-
trine, also championed by Holmes, is the objective theory of intent 
which underwrites the doctrines of offer and acceptance governing 
contract formation. In the classical conception, a contract is formed 
when an offeror makes an offer to an offeree, which the offeree ac-
cepts in return. The question then arises whether a person makes 
or accepts an offer only by subjectively intending to do so, or can 
41 Id. 
42 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 35–36. 
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do so merely by engaging in conduct that communicates an offer or 
acceptance, whether intentionally or not. Holmes answered that 
the law of offer and acceptance was governed solely by the out-
ward expressions of intent and not the subjective state of mind. 
The first Restatement embeds this objective theory of intent in Sec-
tion 20, which states: 
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an informal 
contract is essential to its formation and the acts by which 
such assent is manifested must be done with the intent to do 
those acts; but . . . neither mental assent to the promises in the 
contract nor real or apparent intent that the promises shall be 
legally binding is essential.43 
The comment to Section 20 further provides that “if the manifesta-
tion is at variance with the mental intent . . . it is the expression 
which is controlling. Not mutual assent but a manifestation indicat-
ing such assent is what the law requires.”44 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts follows suit.45 
The sole exhibit in Gilmore’s brief to undermine the credentials 
of the objective theory of intent is Holmes’s analysis of Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus (1864).46 In that case, the plaintiff was a seller of cotton 
who contracted with the defendant buyer for the sale of 125 bales 
of cotton to be shipped from Bombay to Liverpool.  Seller ten-
dered delivery of the cotton when it arrived in Liverpool on a ship 
named Peerless, which had departed from Bombay in December, 
but the buyer refused to accept and pay for delivery of the cotton. 
The buyer’s defense was that he had understood the term “Peer-
less” to refer to a ship of that name departing Bombay in October, 
not December. The court ruled in favor of the buyer without stat-
ing the ground for its ruling. But the court interrupted defense 
43 Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 20 (1932). 
44 Id. § 20, cmt. a. 
45 “[T]he formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation 
of mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration.” Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts §17(1) (1981). “Manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange requires that 
each party either make a promise or begin or render a performance.” Id. at § 18. “A 
promise is a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, 
so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.” 
Id. at § 2(1). 
46 (1864) 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.). 
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counsel during oral argument to announce its decision from the 
bench immediately after he had argued that because both parties 
did not intend to refer to the same ship named Peerless, “there was 
no consensus ad idem [agreement as to the same thing], and there-
fore no binding contract.”47 Because the court never inquired into 
the reasonableness of either party’s understanding, Gilmore sur-
mised that the court must have deemed it sufficient to void a con-
tract that the parties did not share the same subjective understand-
ing of the meaning of a material term in their agreement.48 
But when Holmes analyzed Raffles, he argued that: 
The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’ 
minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and 
judge parties by their conduct. If there had been but one “Peer-
less,” and the defendant had said “Peerless” by mistake, meaning 
“Peri,” he would have been bound. The true ground of the deci-
sion was not that each party meant a different thing from the 
other, as is implied by the explanation which has been men-
tioned, but that each said a different thing. The plaintiff offered 
one thing, the defendant expressed his assent to another.49 
Gilmore sarcastically derided Holmes’s analysis as “an extraor-
dinary tour de force,” arguing that “[t]he magician who could ‘ob-
jectify’ Raffles v. Wichelhaus . . . could, the need arising, objectify 
anything.”50 But on the view that the precedential authority of a 
case resides in its outcome alone, Holmes’s objective intent theory 
of the case is not fraudulent, even if, as Gilmore claimed, the court 
decided the case on the ground that the parties lacked a shared 
subjective intent. The validity of Holmes’s theory turns on its plau-
sibility as an explanation and justification of the case outcome 
alone, not on its consistency with the deciding court’s express rea-
soning. Holmes’s explanation of the case is that when the parties 
said “Peerless,” they were in effect saying different things. 
Holmes’s point, of course, is not that the parties uttered different 
sounds, but that their utterances of the same sound counted as 
“saying” the same word only if each party had sufficient reason to 
47 2 H. & C. at 907, 159 Eng Rep. at 376. 
48 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 43–44. 
49 Holmes, supra note 9, at 242. 
50 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 45. 
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know the ship to which the other intended to refer by uttering the 
name “Peerless.” To be sure, according to the objective theory of 
intent, the mere lack of subjective agreement is not fatal to con-
tract formation, as it is on the subjective theory. But even the ob-
jective theory of intent requires objective agreement for contract 
formation. If each party reasonably but erroneously believes that 
the other party is referring to the same thing, then even shared ob-
jective intent is lacking and formation does not occur. Although 
the court in Raffles did not inquire into the reasonableness of the 
buyer’s erroneous belief that the seller was using the term “Peer-
less” to refer to the ship departing Bombay in October, Holmes 
can be read as fairly inferring that the court implicitly treated that 
belief as reasonable. After all, the case reveals no reason for either 
party to have known that there were two ships named Peerless de-
parting Bombay and arriving in Liverpool. Holmes’s theory of Raf-
fles is therefore plausible as an explanation and justification of its 
outcome, even if inconsistent with the court’s implicit ground of 
decision.51 
Thus, according to Gilmore, the device Holmes used to perpe-
trate his fraudulent “reinterpretation” of Raffles was the idea that 
a case has a “true ground of decision,” which may be different 
51 For the same reason, Holmes’s objective intent account is just as plausible as Gil-
more’s subjective intent account of the court’s implicit ground of decision. When the 
court interrupted following defense counsel’s argument that there was no consensus 
ad idem, it could be fairly read as treating either the lack of subjective intent or the 
lack of objective intent as dispositive. Notably, in commenting on the first Restate-
ment’s embrace of Holmes’s interpretation of Raffles, Arthur Corbin endorsed it as 
correct: 
[T]he actual decisions being rendered cannot be explained and their rules re-
stated without making use of the objective theory. . . . With respect to the case 
of the ship “Peerless” . . . it is believed that there was no contract, not because 
of the absence of a meeting of two hypothetical “minds,” but because the objec-
tive expressions of the two parties were not in agreement and did not so identify 
the subject matter of the contract as to make it enforceable. In the light of the 
surrounding facts, the words used by the two parties might equally well be 
taken to express any one of the following: (1) agreement to sell the cotton on 
the October “Peerless”; (2) agreement to sell the cotton on the December 
“Peerless”; (3) a promise to sell cotton on the October “Peerlees” and a return 
promise to buy cotton on the December “Peerless”; (4) a promise to sell cotton 
on the December “Peerless” and a return promise to buy cotton on the October 
“Peerless.” 
Arthur Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Insti-
tute, 15 Iowa L. Rev. 19, 34–35 (1929). 
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than, and even contradictory to, the express or implied ground of 
the judges who decided the case.52 But here again, Gilmore failed 
to grasp that the formalists regarded precedential authority as re-
siding in case outcomes alone, not in the express, or even implied, 
reasoning of the judges deciding cases. On this view, the real doc-
trine (or “true ground”) of cases is the “theory” of the doctrine 
that best explains the case outcomes. Holmes was cheating only on 
the view that the precedential authority of a case resides in the ex-
press or implied reasoning of the judge deciding it, a view that 
Holmes (like Lord Ellenborough before him) quite explicitly re-
jected. 
II. FROM FORMALIST TO DEONTIC THEORIES OF CONTRACT 
I have so far focused on Gilmore’s criticisms of Williston’s use of 
legal authority to support core doctrines in the classical conception 
of contract law. But Gilmore also famously argued that even 
though the bargain theory of contract law actually became law at 
some point (in his view, largely as a result of the formalists’ consid-
erable efforts to make it the law), it was nonetheless almost com-
pletely reabsorbed into tort law during the first half of the twenti-
eth century. Indeed, Gilmore predicted that the first-year course in 
contracts would soon be replaced by a course entitled “contorts.” 
So Gilmore’s assault on contracts was double-edged: contracts as a 
distinctive and unified body of law did not exist prior to the suc-
cessful efforts of Langdell, Holmes, and Williston to manufacture it 
out of whole cloth,53 and it was eroded by tort law after its crea-
52 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 45, 46. 
53 “Until the late eighteenth century there was no such thing as a . . . law of con-
tracts. Before then there were cases . . . about contracts. But cases are one thing and a 
systematically organized, sharply differentiated body of law is quite another thing.” 
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 9. “For [Justice Joseph] Story, then, there was no such thing 
as a generalized law of—or theory of—contract. . . . Story, indeed, during his astonish-
ingly productive career, wrote treatises on most . . . specialized bodies of law; it never 
occurred to him to write a treatise on ‘Contracts.’” Id. at 12. Justice Story’s son, Wil-
liam Wetmore Story, wrote the Treatise on the Law of Contracts Not Under Seal 
(1844), revised and expanded in the 1847 second edition. But this treatise did not at-
tempt to present contracts as a unified field but instead treated it as consisting in in-
dependent branches corresponding to different types of transactions, each governed 
by distinct doctrine (for example, contracts of factors, brokers, auctioneers, executors 
and administrators). Id. at 116 n.16. Even Parsons on Contracts (1853), written by 
Theophilus Parsons, the Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School from 1848 
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tion.54 Taken as a whole, Gilmore’s thesis is that contract law never 
was nor could be maintained as a conceptually unified and distinc-
tive body of law. In fact, Gilmore’s thesis was shared by other 
prominent twentieth-century contract scholars, such as Patrick 
Atiyah and Lon Fuller, who argued that the origins and current 
doctrine of contract law were grounded in the concern to protect 
individuals’ reliance interest, rather than expectancy interest, as 
classical theory maintained.55 It is not difficult to understand why 
this would offend the jurisprudential sensibilities of adherents to 
classical orthodoxy. If true, then contract law might be scientifically 
disreputable and contract law adjudication might be illegitimate. 
Whether so-called “contract” decisions were adjudicatively legiti-
mate would depend on whether tort law, which really governed 
them, is amenable to a scientifically respectable analysis that dem-
onstrated its adjudicative legitimacy. But by Gilmore’s time, classi-
cal orthodoxy had long been discredited, both by developments in 
scientific theory and the legal realist movement.56 
Although adherents of classical orthodoxy were nowhere to be 
found by the time Gilmore published his critique, his thesis reso-
nated in two of the most heated debates of late twentieth-century 
legal and political theory. The Critical Legal Studies movement 
had begun to resuscitate, in new form, some of the claims of legal 
realism.57 In particular, CLS shared legal realism’s claim that for-
until 1870, “also turns out to be, on examination, simply a treatment, seriatim, of the 
several types of ‘commercial contracts’ identified by Justice Story and analyzed in his 
own Commentaries and in his son’s two Treatises.” Id. 
54 “[T]he theory of contract, as formulated by Holmes and Williston, seems to have 
gone into its protracted period of breakdown almost from the moment of its birth.”  
Gilmore, supra note 6, at 63. “During the past forty years we have seen the effective 
dismantling of the formal system of classical contract theory. We have witnessed what 
it does not seem too farfetched to describe as an explosion of liability.” Id. at 72. 
55 See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (1981); P.S. Atiyah, Essays on 
Contract (1986); L.L. Fuller and William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Con-
tract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936). 
56 As Gilmore pointed out, the realists ironically used Langdell’s Socratic case 
method to prove that any formal construction of legal doctrine could be equally de-
constructed by the same method. “By the 1930s, at least in the law schools, the Lang-
dellian position had become untenable—and, in an unkind reversal, the case method 
of teaching had been turned on its head and used to disprove everything its inventor 
had held dear.” Gilmore, supra note 6, at 65. 
57 For an excellent critical introduction to CLS, see Mark Kelman, A Guide to Criti-
cal Legal Studies (1987). For an overview of American Legal Realism, see Brian Le-
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mal doctrinal analysis was nothing more than conceptual window 
dressing. But CLS coupled doctrinal skepticism with the claim that 
the law’s pretense of formal and objective validity was used sys-
tematically to advance particular political interests at the expense 
of other interests. CLS not only questioned law’s legitimacy indi-
rectly by asserting its lack of conceptual integrity, but also directly 
by claiming that it served as a tool to provide pretextually objective 
justifications for social decisions in favor of particular social inter-
ests or points of view. Since liberalism was often advanced as the 
political theory that provided an objective justification of the legal 
system, the CLS movement was intended as an attack on the integ-
rity of liberalism as well. In short, CLS asserted the adjudicative il-
legitimacy of all law, and the cornerstone of its critique was the 
claim that law’s formal categories and doctrines were both artifi-
cially manufactured (to serve particular interests under the guise of 
liberalism) and demonstrably indeterminate or contradictory. 
At the same time that the CLS movement was emerging, a ren-
aissance in both jurisprudence and political philosophy was well 
under way. In jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin had just argued that 
even hard cases had right answers.58 In contrast to H.L.A. Hart’s 
positivism, Dworkin’s rights theory held that the law always in-
cluded principles of political morality sufficient to resolve any dis-
pute not covered by positive legal rules.59 In political philosophy, 
Rawls had just published A Theory of Justice, which was widely re-
garded as making a brilliant and ground-breaking argument for the 
claim that political coercion could be justified on the basis of uni-
versally justified (liberal) principles of justice.60 Against this intel-
lectual backdrop, Gilmore’s critique was naturally perceived as 
ammunition for the CLS critique of law’s conceptual integrity and 
legitimacy. In response, Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise 
iter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 
267 (1997), and Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal 
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (2007). 
58 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81–130 (1977). 
59 For Hart’s classic statement of American legal positivism, see H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law (1961). For Dworkin’s critique of Hart’s positivism, see Dworkin, su-
pra note 58, at 14–45; see also Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defence 
of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory 65–217 (2001). 
60 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press 1999) (1971). 
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emerged as the first contemporary, comprehensive, deontic theory 
of contract. 
A. Charles Fried’s Contract as Promise 
Charles Fried begins his book, Contract as Promise (1981), with 
the proclamation that “[t]he promise principle . . . is the moral ba-
sis of contract law.”61 Fried’s theory of contract is motivated by the 
attacks on the classical conception of contract leveled by Gilmore 
and other contemporaries. Together, these attacks rejected the 
idea that contract was a body of law capable of unification under 
any single concept, principle, or theory that distinguished it as a 
coherent and distinctive body of law. In particular, these critics de-
nied that contract law could be explained or justified by the will 
theory—the view that the obligations contract law enforced are 
self-imposed. By rejecting the will theory, these critics denied that 
contract law could be justified on the ground that it respected “the 
dispositions individuals make of their rights, [and thereby] carries 
to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have 
rights.”62 The heart of Fried’s claim is that the will theory, properly 
understood, can explain and justify contract law. 
Like the formalists, Fried defends the claim that contract law has 
an “essential unity” and “offers a distinct and compelling ground of 
obligation.”63 And like the formalists, his ultimate motivation is to 
vindicate the adjudicative legitimacy of contract law. But as we 
have seen, for the formalists the primary strategy for proving the 
adjudicative legitimacy of contract law was to demonstrate how 
contract law could provide the basis for a decision in a case (for 
them, how the law could determine the outcome in a case), rather 
than proving that the law was itself justified. Their efforts to prove 
the coherence of contract law were part of their effort to show how 
contract law determined results in cases. If contract law could not 
be conceptually unified, contract law would be comprised of a 
hodgepodge of case types that applied unsystematically, unpre-
dictably, and incoherently to particular cases. In contrast, Fried’s 
effort to prove the coherence of contract law is not motivated by a 
61 Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 1 (1981). 
62 Id. at 2. 
63 Id. at 6. 
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concern to explain how contract law provides the basis of decisions, 
let alone determines results, in contracts cases. For Fried, the pri-
mary challenge of demonstrating the adjudicative legitimacy of 
contract law is proving that contract law itself is justified by a com-
pelling moral principle. So for him, the attacks on the conceptual 
unity of contract law undermined the prospect that contract law 
could be justified by subsuming it under a single moral principle. 
Fried’s strategy is to prove the adjudicative legitimacy of con-
tract law by demonstrating that a single moral principle both ren-
ders contract law’s otherwise distinct doctrines coherent and pro-
vides its deep moral justification. He argues that contract law is 
justified because it enforces the moral obligations of promisors, 
and the correlative moral rights of promisees, that arise out of the 
act of promising. By making a promise, an individual invokes the 
social convention of promising, which invites the promisee to trust 
the promisor. Trust, in turn, enables individuals to give effect to 
their will, to pursue their lives autonomously by cooperating with 
others. The institution of promising enables individuals to invoke 
morality to pursue their own conceptions of the good freely and ef-
fectively. As such, promising is vital to the liberal conception of the 
self and society. By making a promise, a promisor incurs the moral 
obligation to keep the trust he willfully invited. By breaking his 
promise, the promisor abuses this trust.64 Contract law serves to 
prevent or remedy such morally impermissible abuses of trust.65 
Thus, Fried’s central claim is that contract law is justified because it 
enforces the moral obligation to keep promises, which in turn is 
central to liberal individualism. 
In the development of contract theory, Fried’s theory is most 
important for both its emphasis on defending the distinctiveness 
64 See id. at 8, 16. 
65 In Fried’s words,  
[T]rust becomes a powerful tool for our working our mutual wills in the 
world. . . . The device that gives trust its sharpest, most palpable form is prom-
ise. By promising we put in another man’s hands a new power to accomplish his 
will, though only a moral power: What he sought to do alone he may now ex-
pect to do with our promised help, and to give him this new facility was our very 
purpose in promising. By promising we transform a choice that was morally 
neutral into one that is morally compelled. Morality . . . is itself invoked, 
molded to allow us better to work that particular will. 
Id. at 8. 
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and coherence of contract law and the implicit theory of preceden-
tial authority on which Fried relies in mounting that defense.66 We 
have seen that Williston implicitly subscribed to the view that pre-
cedential authority resides in case outcomes, rather than express 
judicial reasoning. Fried implicitly subscribes to the opposite view. 
Indeed, the doctrinal inspiration for his theory of contract as prom-
ise is Section 1 of the second Restatement, which states that “[a] 
contract is a promise . . . for the breach of which the law gives a 
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recog-
nizes a duty.” Rather than relying directly on express judicial rea-
soning, Fried typically treats Williston’s treatise itself, along with 
both Restatements, as sources of contract doctrine equally as au-
thoritative as the cases themselves. The best example is Fried’s 
analysis of the consideration doctrine. Fried considers the doctrine 
because it is widely regarded to be an essential component of con-
tract law. The bargain theory of consideration is the cornerstone of 
the formalists’ unified conception of contract law, and yet it ap-
pears to be a clear counterexample to Fried’s thesis that contract 
doctrine can be explained and justified by the moral promise prin-
ciple.67 If Fried’s thesis is correct, then contract law should enforce 
all morally binding promises. But the consideration doctrine is 
used to prevent the legal enforcement of a large class of promises 
that are morally binding. 
Fried’s analysis of the consideration doctrine begins by identify-
ing the doctrine with its formulations in the first and second Re-
statements, and Williston’s and Arthur Corbin’s descriptions of it 
66 Because they are not germane to the present discussion, I do not discuss two fun-
damental criticisms of Fried’s theory that have featured prominently in contract the-
ory scholarship. The first critique is that Fried’s theory presupposes without argument 
that the law should enforce the moral obligation to keep promises. Given the well-
developed arguments against legal moralism, defense of Fried’s theory requires either 
a defense of legal moralism or an argument for why the legal enforcement of morality 
is justified in the case of promises. The second is that his theory is unfalsifiable be-
cause it defines contract law as those doctrines that can be explained by the promise 
principle, rather than claiming that the promise principle can explain most doctrines 
that are widely regarded, pretheoretically, to be core contract doctrines. See Kraus, 
supra note 15, at 703–15. 
67 Although Fried can dismiss most cases not explicable in terms of the moral prom-
ise principle by relegating them to other areas of the law (such as tort law), there is no 
plausible alternative doctrinal home for the consideration cases. Even for Fried, the 
consideration doctrine, if internally coherent, is a counterexample to his theory. 
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in their treatises. Although these descriptions sometimes quote di-
rectly from cases, more often they represent the authors’ views of 
the rules and principles implicitly, if not explicitly, underlying the 
cases. Accordingly, Fried identifies the consideration doctrine with 
two propositions culled from Williston’s treatise and the Restate-
ments: 
(A) The consideration that in law promotes a mere promise into 
a contractual obligation is something, or the promise of some-
thing, given in exchange for the promise. (B) The law is not at all 
interested in the adequacy of the consideration. The goodness of 
the exchange is for the parties alone to judge—the law is con-
cerned only that there be an exchange.68 
Fried then goes on to consider ten classic consideration cases 
and concludes that propositions (A) and (B) cannot explain their 
outcomes. The reason, Fried argues, is that (A) affirms exchange 
while (B) affirms freedom of contract, yet “[t]hese two ideas turn 
out to be contradictory.”69 In short, (A)’s requirement that some-
thing be given in exchange for a promise is, in principle, eviscer-
ated by (B)’s prohibition against judicial inquiry into the adequacy 
of the thing given in exchange for a promise. Fried’s analysis of the 
ten cases is, therefore, purely illustrative. His proof of the internal 
incoherence of the consideration doctrine follows from his analysis 
of (A) and (B) alone. And it is on this ground that Fried rejects the 
consideration doctrine as inexplicable and unjustifiable, thereby 
removing an otherwise serious obstacle to his argument that con-
tract doctrine can be explained and justified by the promise princi-
ple. In Fried’s words, the bargain theory of consideration and its 
doctrinal extensions70 are “obviously gibberish.”71 The considera-
tion doctrine is no counterexample to Fried’s thesis because it is in-
coherent and therefore cannot be explained or justified by any 
theory of contract law. Since it is incoherent, it should be rejected 
as bad law or no law at all. 
68 Fried, supra note 56, at 29. 
69 Id. 
70 These second Restatement sections state rules for enforcing promises made for 
benefits received (the material benefit rule, § 86), modifying agreements (§ 89), and 
reviving otherwise unenforceable debts (§§ 82 and 83). 
71 Fried, supra note 56, at 32. 
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Evidently, it did not occur to Fried that statements of doctrine in 
Williston’s treatise and the Restatements were themselves not al-
ways the result of an effort to summarize the express judicial rea-
soning in the dominant case law, but instead represented a deliber-
ate effort to articulate a principle or rule that best accounted for 
the case outcomes, whether or not it coincided with the express 
reasoning in the most important or majority of cases. When Fried 
concludes that a contract doctrine, as stated in Williston’s treatise 
or the Restatements, cannot render the case outcomes coherent, he 
dismisses the doctrine itself, rather than the particular statement of 
it, as incoherent. Here Fried’s implicit assumption is either that 
Williston and the authors of the Restatements accurately described 
the express judicial reasoning in the cases allegedly supporting the 
doctrine Williston states, or that Williston’s or the Restatements’ 
version of the doctrine, whether or not an initially accurate account 
of express judicial reasoning, has been expressly accepted in judi-
cial decisions since, in effect transforming it into express judicial 
reasoning. Either way, the irony is that Williston himself would not 
regard a demonstration that his own statements of contract doc-
trine failed to explain the case outcomes, or were internally inco-
herent, as grounds for concluding that there is no coherent doctrine 
that adheres in the case outcomes. Rather, just as a scientist con-
fronted with disconfirming but accurate data would reject his the-
ory, and not the recalcitrant data, Williston would have rejected his 
own account of the doctrine and attempted to identify a more satis-
factory theory of the doctrine that better accommodated the case 
outcomes in question. That Fried does not follow suit indicates that 
he treats the precedential authority of cases as residing in the (sec-
ondary sources he takes to be proxies of) express judicial reasoning 
in the cases rather than the principle or rule that best explains the 
case outcomes, whether or not the judges who decided the cases 
expressly identified the same or a different principle or rule as the 
ground for their decisions. 
B. Fried’s Affinity to the Express Reasoning View of Precedential 
Authority 
Just as the formalists’ theory of the adjudicative legitimacy helps 
explain their view that precedential authority resides in case out-
comes, Fried’s theory of adjudicative legitimacy helps explain his 
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implicit embrace of the view that precedential authority resides in 
express judicial reasoning (or what he regarded as authoritative 
summaries thereof). By treating express judicial reasoning as mere 
theories of doctrines, and not the doctrines themselves, the formal-
ists maximized the likelihood that a small set of unifying principles, 
and derivative rules, would be able to account for the large body of 
cases applying contract law. In contrast, the common premise in all 
of Fried’s doctrinal arguments is that precedential authority resides 
in express or implied judicial reasoning rather than case outcomes 
alone. This view of precedential authority allows Fried to raise the 
bar against competing explanations and justifications of contract 
law. By treating judicial reasoning as the doctrine itself, rather than 
a fallible theory of the doctrine, his view of precedential authority 
eliminates competing theories that can account for case outcomes 
only by rejecting the actual judicial reasoning used in contracts 
cases. Moreover, it allows Fried to take full advantage of the nor-
mative language and structure of contract cases to vindicate his 
claim that the moral promise principle justifies contract law. In-
deed, if we take the express statements of cases (or their summa-
ries in treatises and restatements) to constitute contract doctrine, 
the idea of Contract as Promise could hardly be more intuitive: The 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts defines contract in terms of 
promise.72 Finally, unlike the formalists, Fried is not concerned that 
identifying doctrine with express judicial reasoning will constrain 
his theory’s ability to provide a unified account of case outcomes 
with different or inconsistent express judicial reasoning. Fried’s ob-
jective is not to subsume as many cases as possible, or even a pre-
theoretically identified core of cases, under the promise principle. 
Instead, his goal is to establish that the core of contract law can and 
should be defined only by those doctrines grounded in the moral 
promise principle. Fried accomplishes this simply by stipulating 
that the cases invoking express judicial reasoning based on the 
moral promise principle constitute the core of contract law. All 
other cases, on Fried’s view, simply fall outside the province of 
contract law.73 
72 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). 
73 See supra text accompanying note 62. 
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Although Fried’s view of precedential authority is ideally suited 
to his defense of this claim, he never acknowledges that a full the-
ory of adjudicative legitimacy not only requires a theory of the jus-
tification of contract law but also an account of how contract law 
provides the basis for deciding outcomes in contract cases. Indeed, 
one of the central criticisms of deontic theories of contract in gen-
eral, and Fried’s theory in particular, is that the deontic concepts 
that, in their view, comprise contract doctrine lack the capacity to 
provide the basis for deciding which party should prevail in con-
tracts cases.74 While serious theories of judicial decisionmaking dif-
fer in their accounts of how law provides the basis for deciding 
cases, and certainly have divergent answers to the question of 
whether law can or should determine case outcomes, deontic theo-
ries such as Fried’s typically ignore the burden of addressing this 
essential component in a theory of adjudicative legitimacy. 
III. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACT LAW 
Gilmore’s assault on formalist contract theory, together with the 
CLS critique of law, implied that any attempt to provide a unified 
theoretical account of contract law was bound to fail. Fried’s the-
ory of contract as promise defended the claim that contract law 
could be unified under a single theoretical account. In that sense, 
Fried’s theory shared the formalists’ aspiration to demonstrate the 
internal coherence of contract law. But his theory’s studied indif-
ference to explaining case outcomes flaunted the central concern 
that motivated the formalists to provide a unified account of con-
tract: to prove that contract case outcomes were determined by the 
largely mechanical application of legal rules, rather than the opera-
tion of judicial discretion. 
Developing alongside Gilmore’s critique and Fried’s response 
was the nascent field of law and economics. The first generation of 
scholars offering an economic analysis of contract law seemed to 
conceive of their enterprise much as the formalists conceived of 
theirs. Both the classical theorists and economic analysts sub-
scribed to the precedents-as-outcomes view because it maximized 
their ability to reconcile case law with their conception of contract 
74 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989). 
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law, which often was unsupported by the express judicial reasoning 
in contracts precedents. But the classical conception of contract 
law was premised on the view that only a formal system of contract 
law could produce determinate case outcomes. The economic con-
ception of contract law, however, was premised on the view that 
economic reasoning was at least in principle capable of uniquely 
determining case outcomes, while the express reasoning of con-
tracts cases typically was not. 
A representative example of early explanatory economic analy-
sis is Charles Goetz and Robert Scott’s classic 1980 article, “En-
forcing Promises,”75 which appears to embrace something like the 
formalists’ conception of precedential authority. In that article, 
Goetz and Scott conceive of their enterprise as an attempt to de-
mystify the otherwise unhelpful doctrinal rhetoric of promissory 
estoppel by providing an account that explains how actual case 
outcomes are determined in adjudication. Consider their analysis 
of Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. That sec-
tion states that “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably 
expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee 
or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance 
is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.”76 Goetz and Scott presume that the term “reasonable” 
offers no concrete guidance for how judges should or will decide 
cases under Section 90 and offer their theory as an explanation of 
the meaning of the key substantive language in Section 90: 
In order to discourage the promisee from overrelying, the promi-
sor must not be held liable for damages when the promisee knew 
or should have known that the marginal cost of self-protection 
was lower than the corresponding marginal reduction in prospec-
tive regret costs. This rule gives meaning to the concept of “rea-
sonable reliance.”77 
Goetz and Scott clearly regard the purely doctrinal accounts of 
when promissory liability will be imposed as unilluminating be-
cause they fail to explain the pattern of outcomes in cases. For ex-
75 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the 
Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L.J. 1261 (1980). 
76 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). 
77 Goetz & Scott, supra note 75, at 1280 (emphasis added). 
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ample, they write that the pattern of enforcement under the bar-
gain theory 
typically has been explained in terms of differences in the magni-
tude of either actual or likely reliance. Neither explanation is 
persuasive. . . . The enforcement pattern could be explained if, 
during entry into, and exit from, bargaining, reassurance were 
cheaper than precaution. Then, the risk of a regret contingency 
could be allocated more cheaply by adjusting reliance once the 
promise is made rather than restricting the promise itself.78 
They then conclude that “the design of the consideration model 
can be explained persuasively by an analysis of efficient risk alloca-
tion.”79 
Like the formalists, Goetz and Scott take legal doctrine to con-
sist in the best explanation of the pattern of outcomes in contract 
cases rather than the rhetoric of the judicial reasoning in contracts 
cases. Again, in discussing promissory estoppel, Goetz and Scott 
write that “[a]lthough the rhetoric of some [promissory estoppel 
cases] suggests that reimbursement damages are the preferred re-
covery under promissory estoppel, the outcomes imply that courts 
are animated by the same [economic] concerns that have produced 
the design of the consideration model.”80 After presenting their 
economic analysis of the optimal promissory enforcement regime, 
Goetz and Scott conclude that “a substantial congruence exists be-
tween traditional contract rules and optimal promissory enforce-
ment. Indeed, this congruence offers a persuasive explanation for 
the peculiar patterns of promissory liability observed in actual prac-
tice.”81 Finally, in their conclusion, Goetz and Scott claim that 
“[e]conomic concepts are useful . . . in specifying the effects of legal 
objectives and in observing and isolating systemic patterns of en-
forcement. . . . [S]ystematic collection and observation of data in-
creases understanding of the regulation of behavior by legal 
rules.”82 For Goetz and Scott, then, the task of explanatory eco-
78 Id. at 1294–95. 
79 Id. at 1296. 
80 Id. at 1315 (emphasis added). 
81 Id. at 1265 (emphasis added). 
82 Id. at 1321. 
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nomic analysis is to explain how outcomes are determined in con-
tracts cases. 
Of course, since Goetz and Scott do not reflect on the jurispru-
dential foundations of their project, we can only speculate that 
their conception of legal explanation derived from the same kinds 
of considerations that I have argued motivated the formalists. 
That speculation finds support in one of the few explicit reflec-
tions to be found in the early law-and-economics literature. Rich-
ard Posner, the chief exponent of the positive economic analysis 
of law, published the first treatise on law and economics in 1972.83 
In the third edition of his treatise, published in 1986, Posner de-
scribes what he takes to be the motivating aspirations of positive 
economic analysis of law. Just as Fried seeks to demonstrate the 
unity of contract law using a deontic principle, Posner begins by 
affirming the aspiration to demonstrate the underlying coherence, 
or unity, of the law using an economic principle: “The law is a sys-
tem; it has a unity that economic analysis can illuminate.”84 But 
the similarity between Fried’s and Posner’s conceptions of legal 
theory ends there. Posner goes on to explain that economic analy-
sis seeks to explain the “legal rules and outcomes” of the common 
law.85 More specifically, he argues that the “true grounds” of deci-
sions often are not reflected in judicial rhetoric: “It is an advan-
tage of economic analysis rather than a drawback that it does not 
analyze cases in the conceptual modes employed in the opinions 
themselves.”86 Moreover, Posner claims that the “economic theory 
of law is the most promising positive theory of law extant. 
While . . . other social scientists besides economists also make 
positive analyses of the legal system, their work is thus far insuffi-
ciently rich in theoretical or empirical content to afford serious 
competition to the economists.”87 
Posner’s remarks suggest an affinity between his conception of 
explanatory economic analysis and the formalists’ conception of 
83 The Death of Contract was published in 1974 and Contract as Promise was pub-
lished in 1981. 
84 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, at xx (3d ed. 1986). 
85 Id. at 21. 
86 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 6 (1st ed. 1972). 
87 See Posner, supra note 84, at 24. 
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law as a legal science.88 In particular, both aspire to demonstrate 
the scientific respectability of areas of law by demonstrating how 
the legal rules determine outcomes in cases. Posner’s economic 
analyses of substantive areas of law, especially the common law ar-
eas such as contracts and torts, consist in direct application of eco-
nomic principles to the outcomes of cases, not the doctrinal state-
ments of the judges who decided the cases. Posner’s analysis of 
Bentley v. State89 is typical.90 In that case, Bentley was hired by the 
state of Wisconsin to build new wings for the state capital building 
according to architectural plans supplied by the state’s architect. 
When the wings collapsed due to poor design, the state sued Bent-
ley. The court held for Bentley. Without even citing the judicial 
reasoning of the case, Posner explains it by demonstrating why the 
state was the cheapest insurer of the risk that the architectural 
plans were defective: “[I]t is unlikely that Bentley was a better in-
surer than the state. Bentley would probably have to go out and 
buy an insurance policy; the state could self-insure against the par-
ticular risk.”91 As his analysis of Bentley makes clear, Posner takes 
the explanatory success of economic analysis to consist in its ability 
to correctly determine case outcomes. Like the late nineteenth-
century contract formalists before him, Posner’s explanatory eco-
nomic theory prescinds from the details of doctrinal rhetoric and 
claims to have unearthed a basic principle of economics that un-
88 Thomas Grey also observes that the law-and-economics movement generally, and 
Richard Posner’s work in particular, has a Langdellian foundation: 
A movement in legal theory that has closer links to the Benthamite dream of 
policy science is the school of law and economics. But, on closer inspection, that 
school turns out to be neo-orthodox too. Its leader, Richard Posner, says that 
economic analysis cannot supplant, but only predict and criticize, a course of le-
gal decision carried on case-by-case according to orthodox methods. And Pos-
ner finds “efficiency,” with all the connotation of approval that term carries in 
his theory, in the content as well as the methods of Langdellian private law. 
Grey, supra note 17, at 51. 
89 41 N.W. 338 (Wis. 1889). 
90 Another example is Posner’s discussion of causation in torts cases: “The results in 
these cases seem to owe little to refined notions of causation, and much to considera-
tions of (economic) policy, yet they are conventionally discussed by lawyers under the 
rubric of cause in fact.” Posner, supra note 84, at 169. 
91 Id. at 83. 
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derwrites the application of legal doctrines to individual cases.92 
Unlike his formalist predecessors, Posner made several initial at-
tempts to establish the credentials of economic analysis under the 
second prong of adjudicative legitimacy as well. Unfortunately, his 
efforts to explain how legal rules and principles based on various 
notions of efficiency could justify the exercise of political coercion 
were entirely unsuccessful.93 
CONCLUSION 
Gilmore’s The Death of Contract is a landmark of twentieth-
century contracts scholarship. It was the first major occasion for re-
flection on the legal credentials, and therefore the credentialing 
process, of modern American contract law. If we take Gilmore at 
his word, the lesson of his book is that the core legal principles of 
American contract law were virtually a complete fabrication, imag-
ined by a few elite members of the nineteenth-century bar and le-
gal academy and transformed into actual law through brazen and 
bald-faced lies backed by the sheer force of their influential per-
sonalities. It is always dangerous to take Grant Gilmore at his 
92 Describing the seminal status of Ronald Coase’s famous article “The Problem of 
Social Costs,” 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960), in the history of the economic analysis in law, 
Posner claims that: 
An important although for a time neglected feature of Coase’s article was its 
implications for the positive economic analysis of legal doctrine. Coase sug-
gested that the English law of nuisance had an implicit economic logic. Later 
writers have generalized this insight and argued that many of the doctrines and 
institutions of the legal system are best understood and explained as efforts to 
promote the efficient allocation of resources . . . . 
Posner, supra note 84, at 20. Posner then claims that: 
Although few judicial opinions contain explicit references to economic con-
cepts, often the true grounds of legal decision are concealed rather than illumi-
nated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Indeed, legal education consists 
primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical surface to find those grounds, 
many of which may turn out to have an economic character. . . . It would not be 
surprising to find that legal doctrines rest on inarticulate gropings toward effi-
ciency, especially when we bear in mind that many of those doctrines date back 
to the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, when a laissez faire ideology 
based on classical economics was the dominant ideology of the educated classes 
in society. 
Id. at 21. 
93 For a brief review of Posner’s early attempts to defend the principle of wealth 
maximization, see Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract 
Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 Phil. Issues 420, 428–31 (2001). 
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word. If we give Gilmore the charitable interpretation he refused 
to give to the classical theorists, the real lesson is that appearances 
can be deceiving, as much in law as in life. While Gilmore showed 
how the classical theorists’ conception of contract law might appear 
to be inconsistent with the precedent they cited on its behalf, 
whether it constitutes a reasonable use of precedent turns, unsur-
prisingly, on one’s view of how precedents should be interpreted. 
I have argued that the true disagreement between Gilmore and 
the classical theorists is over the question of whether the preceden-
tial authority of cases resides in their express judicial reasoning or 
in the doctrine that best explains their outcomes.94 Once that dis-
pute is settled, the matter of determining the content of late nine-
teenth-century (or any period of) American contract law is com-
paratively straightforward. I have also argued that the fundamental 
stakes in the debate over the nature of precedential authority lie in 
the theory of adjudicative legitimacy. The precedents-as-express-
reasoning view typically fares well in explaining how a theory of 
contract law can satisfy the first prong of adjudicative legitimacy: 
94 The deontic critique of the economic analysis of the common law sets out what is 
perhaps the best known objection to the view that the precedential authority of cases 
consists in the best theory of their outcomes and not in their express or implied judi-
cial reasoning. In Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law 
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 Va. L. 
Rev. 287 (2007), I consider the claim advanced by deontic theorists that the economic 
analysis is disqualified as an explanation of the common law because it lacks an ade-
quate account of express judicial reasoning in common law cases. That critique argues 
that any explanation of the common law must explain or adequately explain away the 
fact that common law judges use express reasoning that is often couched in deontic 
terms which are inconsistent with the exclusively consequentialist reasoning of the 
economic analysis. I argue that the economic analysis has a plausible account for this 
divergence based on semantic evolution and therefore does not presuppose that 
judges either conspire to mislead others or delude themselves. The deontic critique of 
the economic analysis of the common law sets out what is perhaps the best known ob-
jection to the view that the precedential authority of cases consists in the best theory 
of their outcomes and not in their express or implied judicial reasoning. Apart from 
this debate, many additional obstacles confront the precedents-as-outcomes view. For 
example, John Rawls’s highly influential theory, Political Liberalism, holds that the 
justification of political coercion must be provided using public reason, which in turn 
requires that judicial reasoning be publicly accessible. If express judicial reasoning 
provides either no guide or an opaque guide to the legal reasoning on which the case 
was actually decided and the precedential authority for which the case stands, then 
arguably Rawls’s public justification requirement is not met in most common law de-
cisions. I discuss this point in Jody S. Kraus, Legal Determinacy and Moral Justifica-
tion, 48 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1773, 1785 (2007). 
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the requirement that contract law be capable of justifying the exer-
cise of political coercion implicitly threatened as enforcement for 
any judicial judgment. The precedents-as-outcomes view typically 
fares better in explaining how a theory of contract law can satisfy 
the second prong of adjudicative legitimacy: the requirement that 
contract law be capable of explaining how the outcome of the case 
resulted from the legal rules and principles that are supposed to 
explain it. 
Gilmore’s true legacy is his call on contract theorists to reflect on 
the nature of their enterprise. That reflection reveals that just as 
the classical theorists and Gilmore were talking past each other, 
because they subscribed to incompatible views of the nature of 
precedential authority, so too contemporary deontic contract theo-
rists such as Charles Fried, and contemporary explanatory eco-
nomic analysts of contract law such as Charles Goetz, Robert 
Scott, and Richard Posner, are talking past each other for the same 
reason. History repeats itself, especially if we fail to notice and 
heed its lessons. Contract theory, like any theory of law, ultimately 
rests on basic jurisprudential views about the nature of law, legal 
authority, and political legitimacy. By exposing these jurispruden-
tial foundations, contract theorists can move beyond the current 
impasse that impedes productive discussions between competing 
types of contract theory. My hope is that contract theorists might 
then settle on common philosophical denominators to underwrite a 
joint theoretical enterprise to understand and evaluate contract 
law. More modestly, I hope adherents of each competing school of 
contract theory at least no longer suppose that they can engage in 
meaningful dialogue with each other without first clarifying the 
philosophical assumptions at the foundation of their separate en-
terprises. 
 
